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LOUIS FEINSTEIN, Petitioner, v. THE STATE BAR OF 
CALIFORNIA, Respondent. 
[1] Attorneys- Reinstatement- Questions Considered.-Court's 
sole object, on application by disbarred attorney for rein-
statement, is to determine whether his character is such that 
he should be admitted to an office of trust. 
[2] !d.-Reinstatement-Burden of Proof.-Burden of proof is on 
disbarred attorney, applying for reinstatement, to satisfy 
court by positive evidence that effort he has made toward 
rehabilitation of his character has been successful. 
[3] Id.-Reinstatement-Evidence.-Proof of present honesty and 
integrity of disbarred attorney, applying for reinstatment, 
must be sufficient to overcome the court's former adverse judg-
ment of his character. 
[4] Id.-Reinstatement-Evidence.-An attorney who has been 
disbarred for acts involving a high degree of moral turpitude 
should be reinstated only on clear and convincing evidence 
amounting to overwhelming proof of reform. 
[5] Id.-Reinstatement-Pardon.-A pardon for the offense for 
which an attorney was disbarred does not of itself reinvest 
him with the qualities required of an attorney at law. 
[6] !d.-Reinstatement-Effect of Certificate of Rehabilitation.-
Finding of certificate of rehabilitation (Pen. Code, § 4852.13) 
that an attorney disbarred because of his conviction of an 
offense is now of good moral character is not a finding that 
he presently possesses the highest moral qualities required of 
an attorney, nor is it binding on the State Bar or on the 
Supreme Court (Pen. Code, § 4852.15), but at most is merely 
evidence to be considered with other evidence of his present 
qualifications to practice law. 
[7] Id.-Reinstatement-Evidence.-Letters of recommendation 
and favorable testimony of witnesses, especially that of em-
ployers and attorneys, are entitled to considerable weight in 
a proceeding for reinstatement of a disbarred attorney, but 
such evidence, however laudatory or great in quantity, is not 
alone conclusive. 
[1] See 9 Cal.Jur. 10-Yr.Supp. (1949 Rev.), Practice of Law, 
§ 108. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 8] Attorneys, § 179; [2-4, 7] Attor-
neys, §184; [5,6] Attorneys, §177; [9) Attorneys, §187; [10) 
Attorneys, § 185, 
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[8] Id.- Reinstatement- Reformation.-Since reformation is a 
"state of mind," a disbarred attorney applying for reinstate-
ment must show a proper attitude of mind regarding his 
offense before he can hope for reinstatement. 
[9] !d.-Reinstatement-Review of Board's Action.-Although the 
Supreme Court has plenary power to reinstate a disbarred 
attorney, it will accord the greatest deference to the recom-
mendation of the State Bar and its administrative committee, 
and only where the record clearly demonstrates that the 
applicant possesses an acceptable appreciation of the duties 
and responsibilities of an attorney at law in relation to his 
clients and the courts may a decision overruling the unfavor-
able action of the Board of Governors be justified. 
[10] Id.-Reinstatement-Evidence.-Evidence is insufficient to 
warrant the reinstatement of an attorney disbarred because 
of his conviction of a felony where, notwithstanding an un-
conditional pardon following his release on parole and favor-
able testimony of witnesses showing commendable progress 
by him in rehabilitating himself as a member of society, his 
repeated assertions that he committed no wrong in issuing 
certain fictitious checks, coupled with his failure to make any 
attempt since his parole either to determine whether his 
activities resulted in losses to others or to reimburse his 
victims, indicate a continuing failure to comprehend his pro-
fessional responsibilities. 
APPLICATION for reinstatement of disbarred attorney. 
Application denied. 
J. H. Morris for Petitioner. 
Hobert H. Edwards, Jr., and Jerold E. Weil for Respondent. 
THE COUR'l'.-In 1938, upon conviction of a felony, Louis 
Feinstein was disbarred. (Bar M~:--:r52'f.)"'fhe Board 
of Governors of The State Bar upheld the action of an 
administrative committee unanimously recommending the 
denial of his petition for reinstatement. The matter is before 
this court upon Feinstein's petition to review the board's 
action. (Rules on Original Proceedings in Reviewing Courts, 
rule 59 [b].) 
Feinstein was admitted to practice in California in 1927. 
He was convicted upon each of two counts of an indictment 
which charged him with soliciting a client to commit grand 
theft. (Pen. Code, § 653f.) The judgment of conviction was 
affirmed (People v. Humphrey, 27 Oal.App.2d 631 [81 P.2d 
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588]) and he was automatically disbarred. (Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 299 ; now Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6102.) 
Concurrently with the eriminal aetion, disciplinary pro-
ceedings against Feinstein were pending before a local ad-
ministrative committee of 'fhe State Bar upon charges of 
issuing and passing fictitious checks. 'rhe committee unani-
mously recommended his disbarment and the Board of Gover-
nors approved the recommendation. (Bar Misc. No. 1541.) 
Feinstein's petition to this court for a review of those pro-
ceedings was dismissed as having become moot because of 
the previous order of disbarment based upon his conviction 
in the criminal proceeding. (Feinstein v. State Bar, 12 
Cal.2d 461 [85 P.2d 869] ; Hall v. State Bar, 12 Cal.2d 462 
[85 P.2d 870] .) 
Following his conviction, Feinstein was imprisoned until 
his release on parole in 1940. Upon his release, he secured 
employment as a salesman and bookkeeper and later entered 
business for himself as a public accountant, which profession 
he has followed to the present time. In 1950, Feinstein was 
granted a full and unconditional pardon by the Governor 
in accordance with the provisions of sections 4852.01 through 
4852.2 of the Penal Code. 
At the hearings upon his petition for reinstatement before 
the local administrative committee, Feinstein produced 13 
witnesses who testified to his good moral character, diligence, 
and faithful performance of his work. Nine of these witnesses 
had employed him for varying periods since his release from 
prison. Three of them did not know that he had been dis-
barred. The other six knew, or surmised, that he had been 
disbarred, but did not know the facts concerning his diffic 
culties . 
.All of the witnesses who had employed him were satisfied 
with his work and had confidence in him, although only one 
of them had ever had occasion to entrust him with any money. 
Several who testified in his behalf indicated that they would 
not hesitate to employ him in a capacity of trust or con-
fidence should the occasion ever arise. The record includes 
testimony by persons who know Feinstein and his family 
socially. They said that his family relationships were ex-
cellent. Upon the request of Feinstein's counsel, the examiner 
was prohibited from informing any of the witnesses who had 
employed him of the details of Feinstein's disbarment or 
questioning them as to whether such knowledge would alter 
their opinions of him. 
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The remaining four witnesses, three of whom are attorneys, 
knew the details of Feinstein's disbarment. An optometrist 
and two of the attorneys were personal friends of Feinstein, 
but their contact with him since his parole was social only. 
They rated Feinstein as having a high moral character before 
as well as after his conviction. Their opinions that he now is 
morally fit to practice law were based upon circumstances no 
different from those existing before he was disbarred. 
J. H. Morris, Feinstein's brother-in-law and his counsel 
in this proceeding, testified that, in a discussion pertaining 
to his reinstatement, Feinstein denied ever having made the 
fraudulent suggestions attributed to him in the criminal 
prosecution which resulted in his disbarment. Feinstein's 
explanation of the bad check accusations, as related by Morris, 
was that he had given the checks "sort of foolishly, without 
realizing what he was doing." Morris believes Feinstein's 
statement that he was not guilty of the charge of which 
he was convicted and said he would have the same opinion 
of Feinstein's high moral qualifications to practice law irre-
spective of this belief. Other than the present proceeding, 
Morris has had no professional dealings with Feinstein. He 
knew of no instance when Feinstein had been placed in a 
confidential relationship which might have tempted him to 
depart from an ethical course of conduct. 
Testifying on his own behalf, Feinstein admitted the issu-
ance of fictitious checks without sufficient funds to cover 
them as charged in the disbarment proceeding. He also stated 
that he knew his associate, Hall, was issuing similar checks. 
He drew a line through the word ''order'' on the checks, he 
said, to destroy their negotiability and give notice to third 
parties that it was an ''unusual transaction.'' According to 
Feinstein, ''it seemed to be held against me instead of for 
me. I thought I was doing the right thing, and instead I 
was doing the wrong thing. I shouldn't have done anything 
like that at all.'' 
According to Feinstein's testimony, he drew the checks 
to assist a client who was operating a night club. "I don't 
think I collected more than a few hundred dollars at the 
time this thing happened," he said. "It was contemplated 
the more successful the night club was, the more work I did, 
and the more money I would make, but he wasn't any large 
client. It was a few hundred dollars involved, I guess.'' 
As stated by Feinstein to the committee, the bank's presi-
dent informed him at the time of the disbarment proceeding 
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that the bank had lost nothing and that he did not believe 
Feinstein knew anything about the conspiracy to defraud it. 
Feinstein has never made restitution to the bank for losses 
occurring as the result of the check transactions, nor under-
taken any further inquiry as to whether there were losses. 
At the hearing upon his application for reinstatement, 
Peinstein flatly denied any guilt in connection with the 
fraudulent suits which were the basis for the criminal charges 
which resulted in his conviction. He said: ''These cases were 
cases of clients of mine where they admitted that they had 
participated in a fake accident case. 'fhey testified against 
me and the doctor. They were given complete immunity as a 
result of it . . . it was either their skin or the skin of the 
doctor and the lawyer." Later, he remarked: "I never knew 
that either Callie Elliott or anybody else had been in a 
fraudulent claim.'' Feinstein stated that he had never in-
quired as to whether any loss had resulted to the defendants 
from the filing of suits in the negligence actions, nor had he 
repaid any portion of the settlement received in one of those 
cases. 
Feinstein's income tax returns, admitted into evidence, 
indicate that his income has steadily increased from approxi-
mately $4,500 in 1943 to about $13,000 in 1949. His ·1950 
income was $13,000. 
Regarding his legal ability, Feinstein testified that he 
read advance sheets of an accountant's tax service from time 
to time, had subscribed to the Southern California Law 
Review and read a tax magazine containing comments on tax 
law. One of the attorneys who had discussed hypothetical 
legal problems with him found that he had a keen conception 
of the applicable principles. Another attorney stated that 
he and ]'einstein had discussed questions of law common to 
tax matters from time to time. 
Upon the foregoing evidence and the exhibits introduced, 
including the documents in connection with the statutory 
rehabilitation proceeding, the administrative committee unani-
mously concluded that Feinstein has not fully rehabilitated 
himself, lacks the present moral qualifications to warrant his 
reinstatement, and does not have present ability and learning 
in the law sufficient to warrant his reinstatement. These 
conclusions were adopted by the Board of Governors. 
Feinstein contends that the evidence does not support 
certain findings of the committee or the conclusions and 
39 C.2d-18 
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recommendations of the committee and the board. The evi-
dence, he says, conclusively establishes his rehabilitation and 
present good moral character. Concerning his legal ability 
at this time, he offers to take an examination if ordered 
to do so. 'fhe State Bar argues that Feinstein failed 
to meet his burden of proving, by clear and convincing evi-
dence, that he is entitled to reinstatement. 
Reduced to its basic essentials, Feinstein's argument is 
that the evidence which he produced of his present good moral 
character was undisputed. The State Bar, he says, offered 
nothing to overcome this showing and relied solely upon the 
offenses which led to his disbarment. It is his contention that 
undue weight has been given to his past misconduct in reach-
ing the conclusion that he has not been rehabilitated. 
Throughout this proceeding, both in his testimony before the 
committee and in his argument to this court, Feinstein has 
contended that he never intentionally did any wrong and that 
the testimony against him in the criminal case is suspect. 
[1-3] ''The sole object of the court, upon an application 
by an attorney previously disbarred for reinstatement to 
practice, is to determine whether or not the character of the 
applicant is such that he should be admitted to an office of 
trust, and recommended to the public as a trustworthy person, 
fit to be consulted by others in matters of confidence. 
(Citation.) In such proceeding the burden of proof is upon 
the one who seeks, after disbarment, to accomplish a restora-
tion to the ranks of the legal profession, and before the court 
may grant the petition for reinstatement it must be satisfied 
and fully convinced by positive evidence that the effort he 
has made toward rehabilitation of his character has been 
successful. (Citations.) It is only reasonable that the person 
seeking reinstatement, after disbarment, should be required 
to present stronger proof of his present honesty and integrity 
than one seeking admission for the first time whose character 
has never been in question. In other words, in an application 
for reinstatement, although treated by the court as a pro-
ceeding for admission, the proof presented must be sufficient 
to overcome the court's former adverse judgment of appli-
cant's character." (Kepler v. State Bar, 216 Cal. 52, 55 
[13 P.2d 50] ; Beeks v. State Bar of California, 35 Cal.2d 268, 
275 [217 P.2d 409]; McArthur v. State Bar, 28 Cal.2d 779, 
788 [172 P.2d 55].) 
[4] "One who has been disbarred for acts involving a 
high degree of moral turpitude-and those committed by 
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petitioner were of that character-' should not be reinstated 
ln the ranks of the legal profession except upon the most 
clear and convincing, nay, we will say upon overwhelming, 
proof of reform__:_proof which we could with confidence lay 
before the world in justification of a judgment again in-
stalling him in the profession .... '" (In re Morganstern, 
85 Cal.App. 113, 117 [259 P. 90]; Wettlin v. State Bar, 24 
Cal.2d 862, 869 [151 P.2d 255] ; In re Stevens, 59 Cal.App. 
251, 254-255 [210 P. 442].) 
[5] "It has been definitely determined by this court that 
a pardon of an attorney previously disbarred on account of 
his conviction of the offense of which he was subsequently 
pardoned does not of itself reinvest him with those essentials 
required of an attorney at law." (Wettlin v. State' Bar, 
supra; In re Lavine, 2 Cal.2d 324, 329 [ 41 P.2d 161, 42 P.2d 
311].) [6] The finding of the certificate of rehabilitation 
(Pen. Code, § 4852.13) that Feinstein is now of good moral 
character is not one that he presently possesses the highest 
moral qualities required of an attorney, nor is it binding 
upon The State Bar or this court. (Pen. Code, § 4852.15.) 
At most, it is but evidence to be considered together with other 
evidence of his present qualifications to practice law. (In re 
Lavine, supm.) 
[7] Letters of recommendation and the favorable testi-
mony of witnesses, especially that of employers and attorneys, 
are entitled to considerable weight. (Pt·eston v. State Bar, 
28 Ca1.2d 643, 650-651 [171 P.2d 435]; In re Andreani, 14 
Cal.2d 736, 749-750 [97 P.2d 456] .) But such evidence, 
however laudatory or great in quantity, is not alone conclu-
sive. (Wettlin v. State Bar, supra; Kepler v. State Bar, 
snpra, p. 56.) [8] Reformation is a "state of mind" (In re 
Anclreani, supra, p. 749) and "the applicant must show a 
proper attitude of mind regarding his offense before he can 
hope for reinstatement." (Wettlin v. State Bar, supra, 
p. 870.) The committee of The State Bar, which has an 
opportunity to view the witnesses and the petitioner, is in a 
better position than is the reviewing court, faced only with 
the cold printed record, to determine the applicant's state 
of mind. (In re Andreani, supra, p. 750; Vaughan v. State 
Bar, 208 Cal. 740-745 [284 P. 909].) [9] Although this 
court has plenary power to reinstate an applicant previously 
disbarred, it has always accorded the greater deference to 
the recommendation of The State Bar and its administrative 
committee. (In re Lacey, 11 Cal.2d 699, 701 [81 P.2d 935] .) 
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Only where the record clearly and convincingly demonstrates 
that the applicant possesses an acceptable appreciation of 
the duties and responsibilities of an attorney at law in rela-
tion to his clients and the courts may a decision overruling 
the unfavorable action of the Board of Governors be justified. 
(Beeks v. State Bar of Cal'ifornia, sttpra, p. 277.) 
[10] The record here fails to meet the requirement of clear 
and convincing proof of reform. The pardon and the favor-
able testimony of witnesses show commendable progress by 
Feinstein in rehabilitating himself as a member of society, 
but such improvement does not compel the conclusion that 
he now has the hig·hest moral attributes required of an 
attorney. To the contrary, his repeated assertions that, despite 
his conviction and the other disciplinary proceedings against 
him, he committed no wrong, coupled with his failure to 
make any attempt since his parole either to determine whether 
his activities resulted in losses to others or to reimburse his 
victims, indicate a continuing failure to comprehend his pro-
fessional responsibilities. Under some circumstances, "a 
spirit of willingness, earnestness and sincerity" is sufficient 
to permit reinstatement although it is not within the power 
o£ the applicant to undo the damage which his acts have 
caused to others. (In re Andreami, supra, p. 750; Preston v. 
State Bar, supra, p. 650.) But Feinstein has shown no such 
spirit, although it has been within his power not only to 
determine what damage he had caused but to right at least 
some of his wrongs. 
There is nothing in the record which would justify this 
court in ordering either immediate reinstatment or acceptance 
of Feinstein as an applicant for examination upon his techni-
cal qualifications. 
rrhe application of petitioner for reinstatement is denied. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
Upon a record which conclusively establishes the right of 
petitioner to be reinstated, the majority holds that reinstate-
ment is not permissible because petitioner still protests his 
innocence of the felony, the conviction upon which he was 
disbarred, and because he has not restored money said to 
have been improperly obtained by him. As will be shown, 
there was nothing obtained by petitioner and hence there 
is nothing for him to rrstore. lf Jack of penitence is shown 
by clin{ling to one's honest assertion of innocence, then inno-
cence is a crime rather than a virtue. If petitioner has not 
now shown that he is rehabilitated, he never will be able to 
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do so. In the face of a record which conclusively establishes 
rehabilitation, the majority arbitrarily says to him: "You 
must give up all hope of regaining your former position as 
a member of the bar." Let us look at the facts. 
First it was found that prior to the time of petitioner's 
disbarment, disciplinary proceedings were pending against 
him before the Board of Governors and the board had recom-
mended disbarment. Petitioner's petition to this court for a 
review of those proceedings was dismissed by this court be-
cause of the disbarment by reason of his conviction of a 
felony on a different charge. (Feinstein v. State Bar, 12 
Cal.2d 461 [85 P.2d 869] .) Thus no review of those pro-
ceedings has been had by this court and they have no bearing 
on the instant case. The charge in those proceedings arose 
out of the issuing and passing of two :fictitious checks of 
$475 each, and eleven checks totalling $4,200. According to 
the :findings in those proceedings, petitioner had as a client 
a Mr. Zimmer who controlled a corporation which owned 
a cafe. For his legal services to the corporation and past 
loans, petitioner was to receive 25 per cent of the profits of 
the business ; later changed to :fixed weekly installments. 
Zimmer was short of capital and had an arrangement with 
tellers of a Hollywood bank permitting him to overdraw his 
and the corporation's accounts, which eventually led to a 
loss by the bank of $20,000. Zimmer told petitioner of the 
arrangement and asked him to loan him checks drawn on his 
account in the same bank and Zimmer would cover them with 
cash deposits to petitioner's account from cafe receipts; some 
checks were to be sold to a third person. The arrangement 
was carried out by petitioner who gave checks which he had 
rendered nonnegotiable by drawing a line through the word 
''order.'' This would not ordinarily be observed. 'l'he Zimmer 
affair resulted in his being indicted by a federal grand jury 
but the proceeding was dismissed. It also appears that the 
president of the bank tolcl petitioner that he was not liable, 
as he did not know of the deal between Zimmer and the bank 
tellers. Hence, even if we give consideration to the Zimmer 
transactions, petitioner was under no obligation to refund 
anything to the bank. He received nothing and we have the 
bank president's word that nothing was owing. 
In addition to the foregoing facts, the committee also found 
that since petitioner's release from prison in 1940 he has 
operated the business of public accountant, having obtained 
a certificate in 1945 from the state board to do so. In addi-
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tion to his own testimony he produced 13 witnesses, three 
of whom were attorneys, one an optometrist and the others 
persons who had employed him as a bookkeeper. Those for 
whom he kept books testified that he faithfully discharged 
his duties, and in one case that he had been entrusted with 
substantial sums of money and faithfully accounted for his 
trust. Some of those witnesses said he had not handled matters 
for them involving a trust or confidential relationship. One 
attorney testified that he was rehabilitated and knew the 
law, but his only relationship with him consisted of discussions 
of his own cases. Another, a relative, said he had been re-
habilitated. As to his legal ability, he testified that he read 
advance sheets of accountant's tax service from time to time, 
received the Southern California Law Review and read a 
tax magazine containing comments on tax law. The committee 
concluded by finding that petitioner had failed to sustain 
the burden of proving that he had rehabilitated himself, or 
had the moral qualifications, or had sufficient learning or 
ability in the law. 
The recommendation of the board is based solely upon the 
conduct of petitioner between 1935 and 1937, and the asserted 
failure of petitioner to prove his rehabilitation. No other 
evidence was offered by it. On the other hand, petitioner pro-
duced testimony by n'ine witnesses engaged in various busi-
nesses who have employed him as tax consultant, accountant 
and bookkeeper for periods ranging from five to eleven years. 
They all testified that his work was accurate and satisfactory. 
Various remarks were made to the effect that his character 
is ''above reproach'' ; that ''if he conducts himself as well 
as an attorney as he does as an accountant he would make 
a very good attorney"; that he is honest in all respects, 
trustworthy and highly honorable; that: ''I would not be 
afraid to trust the man with the entire store and let him 
take care of it. I trust him fully, he is a trustworthy person." 
While only one witness testified that he had entrusted him 
with his funds, others said they would be willing to do so 
if there were any occasion for it. Some witnesses testified 
that they had not employed him in a confidential capacity, 
and apparently they had no occasion to do so, but if they had, 
they would not hesitate to engage him for such work. Some 
of the witnesses knew and some did not know he had been 
disbarred in 1938, but some of those without that knowledge 
said it would have made no difference in their testimony. 
Sept.1952] FEINSTEIN v. STATE BAR 
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Three attorneys practicing in Los Angeles testified for 
petitioner. One who had known him for 26 years and was 
associated with him for a short time, knew of the disbarment 
and talked to him about it, testified that he now has a good 
sense of morality, has proven himself to be of good moral 
character and fit to practice law. Another testified to sub-
stantially the same effect. Counsel for petitioner in this pro-
ceeding, a brother-in-law of petitioner, testified that he has 
known petitioner since 1944; has had discussions on legal 
questions with him and found him understanding of them; 
that petitioner is morally rehabilitated. An optometrist, who 
had been a friend for 15 years, stated that petitioner had a 
good reputation for honesty. 
Petitioner testified at length regarding his activities both 
before and after disbarment in which he denied any wrong-
doing in the Zimmer matter; that he did not make restitution 
to the bank or anyone else because no money was received 
by him and he did not incur any liability or indebtedness. 
He made special studies in accounting in prison and there-
after, but none in law. 
It is the position of respondent that the burden was on 
petitioner to show that he had become rehabilitated, is now 
of good moral character and learned in the law (see Beeks 
v. State Bar of California, 35 Cal.2d 268 [217 P.2d 409]; 
R,ules of Procedure of The State Bar, rule 52) ; that the past 
conduct of petitioner discloses a mental attitude of a person 
who would commit a wrong when placed in a position of trust 
and confidence if he thought he could escape retribution. 
In respect to the latter contention it would seem more 
accurate to describe petitioner's mental attitude to be that 
of an attorney who would use his office to obtain wrongfully 
something from third persons with whom he did not occupy 
a position of confidence, as the crime of which he was con-
victed, or which, like the Zimmer affair, did not involve the 
defrauding of his client but the gaining of something from 
someone else for his client and himself. And he has con-
clusively proven by the many witnesses above mentioned that 
he is not now the kind of a person who would attempt to 
obtain money from others by fraud. Indeed it has been held 
that the conduct leading to the prior disbarment is too remote 
to be considered on application for reinstatement (In re 
8toller, 160 Fla. 769 [36 So.2d 443]), and the essential ques-
tion is whether he has reformed and his moral stability has 
been restored. It must be remembered that prior to the 
552 FEINSTEIN v. STATE BAR [39 C.2d 
incidents above mentioned, which occurred between 1935 and 
1937, he had not been involved in any difficulty and his good 
moral character was established when he was admitted to 
the bar. 
Moral reformation or rehabilitation has long been a per-
plexing problem to such experts as penologists, psychologists, 
theologians and social workers. \Vhen laymen endeavor to 
ascertain the fact on the evidence of lay witnesses, the 
problem becomes even more complex. It is very difficult for 
an attorney seeking reinstatement to produce witnesses who 
have sufficient intimate knowledge of his conduct both before 
and after his disbarment to give an opinion as to whether 
the applicant has been fully rehabilitated. In most cases, 
witnesses available to the applicant are those who, because 
of their association with him after his disbarment, can testify 
that he then, at the time of the hearing, has a good moral 
character-a reputation for that character. This evidence 
is pertinent because a strong inference flows from his con-
tinuous good character since disbarment that he will not 
again resort to practices which might bring him into dis-
repute. To weigh against that evidence the nature of his 
misconduct and conclude that he has not been rehabilitated, 
is to reject such testimony and the inference which flows 
therefrom. It verges on reaching a conclusion that some 
misconduct may be considered so reprehensible that reforma-
tion is impossible. If it does not go that far, the decision 
of the arbiter becomes mere speculation, because he is re-
quired to weigh the seriousness of the wrong committed 
against positive evidence that the person now has a good 
character, the effect of the former factor on possibility of 
reformation being a mere matter of personal opinion which 
the applicant is helpless to supply evidence to rebut. The 
gravity of the offense should not, therefore, be of compelling 
consequence. The character or nature of the misconduct is 
of importance however, that is, what was done under what 
circumstances. Tt is then possible for the applicant to present 
evidence by acquaintances that under circumstances of a 
similar character generally he has properly conducted him-
self-has not fallen into a similar pattern of wrongdoing. 
Of course, the length of time that applicant has kept himself 
on the side of rectitude is important, for it may be inferred 
that the longer he has been honest, the more likely he will 
Rta~v that way. In this connection, the majority opinion sug-
gests that the testimony of petitioner's witnesses shows that 
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it was not based on circumstances different from those exist-
ing before disbarment; they thought he was honest before 
and still think he is. That is not true of all of the witnesses 
and does not erase the positive, unrefuted evidence that peti-
tioner is now of good moral character. 
In the instant case petitioner has produced such evidence. 
He has shown generally, without dispute, that he now has 
a good moral character. ·while some of his witnesses said 
they had not employed petitioner in a confidential capacity, 
others had, and it should be clear that where one employs 
another to keep his books and prepare his tax returns, the 
employer is placing all the facts relating to his business in 
the employee's hands, a thing he would not do if he did not 
trust the employee. In tax return work, applicant had an 
opportunity to defraud the government to his employer's 
direct benefit and his own incidental benefit, but did not do 
so. If he had, it would be a pattern of misconduct similar 
to that in which he indulged between 1935 and 1937. Neither 
the committee nor the board found that they disbelieved 
petitioner's witnesses. Over 12 years have elapsed since the 
disbarment. If that cannot be considered sufficient time, then 
most of our parole proceedings and penalties for various 
offenses lack a sound foundation. 
Furthermore, it will be recalled that petitioner was granted 
a full and unconditional pardon by the Governor. While it 
has been held that a pardon does not restore to a disbarred 
attorney the right to practice law (Wettlin v. State Bar, 24 
Cal.2d 862 [151 P.2d 255] ; In re Lavine, 2 Cal.2d 324 [ 41 P.2d 
161, 42 P.2d 311]), it is clear that great weight must be given 
to pardons such as the one here involved. The pardon granted 
petitioner•was pursuant to provisions added to the Penal Code 
in 1943. (Pen. Code, §§ 4852.01-4852.2.) Thereunder a released 
prisoner may file with the superior court of the county in which 
he resides a notice of intention to apply for a "certificate 
of 1·ehabilitation." (Pen. Code, § 4852.01.) "During the 
period of rehabilitation the person shall live an honest and 
upright life, shall conduct himself with sobriety and industry, 
shall exhibit a good rnoral character, and shall conform to 
and obey the laws of the land." (Emphasis added.) (ld., 
§ 4852.05.) After the period for rehabilitation has expired 
he may apply to the court for a "declaration of the fact of 
his rehabilitation" -for a "certificate of rehabilitation." 
(Id., § 4852.06.) Notice is given of the application to the dis-
trict attorney, chief of police and Governor. (ld., § 4852.07.) 
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A hearing is had in which is considered testimony and ''all 
records and reports relating to the petitioner and the crime 
of which he was convicted, including the record of the trial, 
the report of the probation officer, if any, the records of 
the prison from which the petitioner has been released show-
ing his conduct during the time he was there imprisoned, 
the records of the prison doctor and the prison psychiatrist, 
the records of the parole officer concerning him if he was 
released on parole, the records of the Youth Correction Au-
thority concerning him if he has been committed to the 
authority, the records of the chief of police or sheriff upon 
whom the notice of intention was served, and written reports 
or records of any other law enforcement agency concerning 
the conduct of the petitioner since his release on parole or 
discharge from custody." (Id., § 4852.1.) Moreover, the 
court "shall require from the district attorney an investiga-
tion of the residence of the petitioner, the criminal record 
of the petitioner as shown by the records of the Bureau of 
Criminal Identification and Investigation, and the investiga-
tion of any representation made to the court by the applicant, 
and the district attorney shall file with the court a full and 
complete report of the results of said investigations, and 
shall require from the district attorney and the chief of 
police or sheriff having jurisdiction as provided in subdivision 
(a) of Section 4852.02 written reports setting forth all matters 
within their knowledge relating to the conduct of the peti-
tioner during his period of rehabilitation, including all 
matters mentioned in Section 4852.11." (I d., § 4852.12.) 
(It should be noted that many more sources are used to 
determine rehabilitation than are customarily available in 
reinstatement proceedings before The State Bar.) H the court 
after the hearing "finds that the petitioner has demonstrated 
by his course of conduct his rehabilitation and his fitness to 
exercise aU of the civil and political rights of citizenship, the 
court shall make an order declaring that the petitioner has 
been rehabilitated and recommending that the Governor grant 
a full pardon to the petitioner." (Emphasis added.) (I d., 
§ 4852.13.) Thus, the precise fact, moral rehabilitation and 
whether petitioner has exhibited a good moral character, 
decided by the court, is presented to The State Bar on appli-
cation for reinstatement. It was observed by this court, with 
respect to the use of a transcript of testimony at a criminal 
trial in a disbarment proceeding: "Petitioner was prosecuted 
in the name of the People of California, and the trial was 
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conducted by attorneys representing the People. In the 
present proceeding the case against petitioner is presented 
by The State Bar, acting as the arm of this court and also 
representing the People of the State. In reality the parties 
are the same. Petitioner's contention that the subject matter 
is not the same is based on the fact that this proceeding is 
for disbarment, whereas the earlier case was a criminal 
prosecution. The Legislature, however, aware that a disbar-
ment proceeding is different from any other type of action, 
could hardly have intended to preclude the use of the tran-
script of an earlier proceeding in a proceeding for disbarment. 
The State Bar seeks to prove the same facts that the public 
prosecutor sought to prove so that both proceedings actually 
do concern the same matter." (Werner v. State Bar, 24 
Cal.2d 611, 616 [150 P .2d 892].) It cannot be doubted, there-
fore, that petitioner's certificate of rehabilitation is a very 
cogent factor. It is not like an ordinary pardon where the 
motive or basis may be merely sympathy or forgiveness. 
A point is made of the failure of petitioner to make restitu-
tion. This is not a case of misuse of a client's funds and 
here it does not appear that petitioner received anything or 
that anyone was entitled to or claimed a right to the restora-
tion of anything. 
Respondent claims a lack of showing of legal ability to 
practice. As above shown, there is evidence that petitioner 
has such ability. Moreover, he is a college graduate, a graduate 
of a law school of high standing, and practiced law for over 
ten years. It will not be presumed he has lost his knowledge. 
The presumption is the other way. (See Friday v. State Bar, 
23 Ca1.2d 501 [144 P.2d 564].) Moreover, petitioner offers 
to take a legal examination if this court deems it necessary. 
From the foregoing it is apparent that the only just and 
and reasonable result is reinstatement. The basis of the 
majority opinion seems to be that petitioner has not made a 
lachrymose display of penitence, or come to the Throne of 
Grace humbly begging forgiveness for sins he claims not 
to have committed. Not only that, but he must apparently 
produce witnesses who have heard him shout from the roof-
tops that he was a sinner but has forsaken his sins and is 
now redeemed. The majority seems to have forgotten that 
deeds speak londer than self-serving protestations. By the 
record petitioner has conclusively demonstrated that his con-
duct since disbarment bas established rehabilitation. Nothing 
more should be required under any system which has for its 
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objective the accomplishment of the American ideal of ''Equal 
jristice under law." 
I would reinstate petitioner as a member of the bar. 
Petitioner's application for a rehearing was denied October 
9, 1952. Carter, J., was of the opinion that the petition 
should be granted. 
[Crim. No. 5324. In Bank. Sept. 19, 1952.] 
THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. BRYAN K. BURNETT, 
Appellant. 
[1] False Pretenses-Issuing Checks Without Sufficient Funds-
Instructions.-Instruction that it is a question for jury whether 
intent to defraud is shown if payee is informed by maker of 
check at time of delivery that there are insufficient funds 
to pay it is error, since there can be no conviction under 
Pen. Code, § 476a, where the payee is so informed. 
[2] Id.- Issuing Checks Without Sufficient Funds- Appeal-
Harmless and Reversible Error.-Erroneous instruction that 
it is jury question whether intent to defraud is shown if 
payee is informed by maker of check at time of delivery that 
there are insufficient funds to pay it was prejudicial, where 
the instruction was not limited to the c,ount as to which the 
jury disagreed, and where, even though it be assumed that the 
jurors had already reached an agreement as to the count on 
which defendant was convicted, it is possible that such in-
struction caused them to reconsider and change their position. 
[3a, 3b] !d.-Issuing Checks Without Sufficient Funds-Appeal-
Harmless Error.-Where there is evidence that a postdated 
check was given in conjunction with a currently dated check, 
and that both checks were given at the same time in payment 
of a single debt under circumstances from which it may be 
inferred that the payee accepted the postdated check with 
notice that there were insufficient funds and hence that there 
was no intent to defraud, an erroneous instruction that it is 
a jury question whether intent to defraud is shown if payee 
is informed by maker of check at time of delivery that there 
are insufficient funds to pay it is prejudicial. 
[1] See Cal.Jur., False Pretenses, § 28; Am.Jur., False Pretenses 
and Allied Criminal Frauds, § 66. · 
McK. Dig. References: [1] False Pretenses, § 68; (2l3] False 
Pretenses, § 69; [ 4] False Pretenses, § 66, 
